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CURRENT LEGISLATION
Editor-WILLiAm J. CAHILL
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-CURTAILMENT OF POWERS OF
COURTS OF EQUITY BY SECTION 882 OF Civn. PRACTICE ACT.
Section 882 of the Civil Practice Act prior to the September,
1930 amendment provided that a Judge or Court, in a proper case,
might grant an injunction ex parte. By the September, 1930 amend-
ment, the application for a preliminary injunction may be granted
only upon notice.- The reaction to ill-considered ex parte injunctions
in labor disputes induced the Legislature to amend Section 882 of
the Act as indicated.
Collateral events show that labor has effected an abridgment
of equity power to the prejudice of other classes. It is difficult
to find a law that does not work harm upon someone. Legislation
is sustained despite the hardship to the few, in view of the benefit
to the greater number. Under this recent amendment, the process
seems to have been reversed, and the good of the majority is stifled
for the benefit of a few. Labor is not the only element of society
which has an interest in the injunction.
The preliminary injunction, aimed primarily at the dishonest
debtor, belongs to all. "The office of a preliminary injunction is
to preserve the status quo, until upon final hearing, the Court may
grant final relief." 2 If notice is given, its effectiveness is destroyed.
Upon the service of notice of application for a preliminary injunc-
tion, the opposing party can destroy the status quo by removing
the subject matter of the litigation beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court.3 The defendant might negotiate commercial paper,4 or trans-
fer title, thus making the judgment, when obtained, unenforceable.
Story, J., points out that the function of the court of equity is pre-
ventative more often than restorative.; Certainly, the September,
1930 legislative amendment to the Civil Practice Act is clearly
retrogressive in character.
Let us consider whether the Legislature acted within its au-
thority when it passed the amendment. Finch, I., who wrote the
dissenting opinion in Hunt v. Stirone,0 concurred in by Merrell, J.,
set forth the proposition that the interim injunction is the creature
of statute, that since the Legislature created the remedy, it may
modify or abolish it. In support of this conclusion, Bachinan v.
'Hunt v. Stirone, 232 App. Div. 262, 249 N. Y. Supp. 591 (1st Dept. 1930).
' Toledo v. Pennsylvania, 54 Fed. 730 (N. D. Ohio, 1893).
'Wolf v. Altman, 196 App. Div. 549, 187 N. Y. Supp. 902 (1st Dept. 1921).
'Ibid.
STORY, EQuITy JURISpRUDENCE (1835) §1182.6Supra note 1.
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Harrington is cited.7 The question before the Court in that case
was, whether the defendant should be punished for contempt of
Court. As the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was not in issue,
the citation of this case for the proposition that a court of equity
has no inherent power to grant the interlocutory injunction, and
that such authority must be found in the Code of Civil Procedure,
is misleading. Judge Cullen, who spoke for the court, must have
realized that when he stated, "While the code authorizes this in-
junction in certain cases, still it is doubtless within the power of the
court of equity, in a proper case to issue mandatory injunctions
and the code should not be so strictly construed as to deny that
power in any case." 8 Even if this dicta has any force, it is clearly
limited by the writer.
It would seem that the Legislature exceeded its authority in
enacting the provision of the Civil Practice Act referred to. The
amended Section 882 is not merely a change in procedure but it is
a curtailment of the power of the court of equity. Judge Learned,
in referring to sections of the Code of Civil Procedure that were
reenacted in the Civil Practice Act relative to injunctions, said:
"The Code is a Code *of practice not designed to introduce new
principles of jurisprudence." 9 Looking back, then, in the settled
rules of equity, we find that while final injunctions are matters of
right, preliminary injunctions are matters of discretion.
The Constitution affords the Legislature ho authority for its
change in Section 882. Our State Constitution provides: "The
Supreme Court is to continue with general jurisdiction in law and
equity, subject to such appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
as is now or may Hereafter be prescribed by law not inconsistent
with this section." 10 Cullen, J., writing for the court in Bachman
v. Harrington, subsequently referred to this section of the Consti-
tution in the words of Daniel, J., "The terms here are so compre-
hensive that they include cases of every description from the most
complicated and important to the most simple and insignificant.""
If the Legislature can limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in one class of cases, it may do so as to any or all others, and com-
pletely abrogate the constitutional provisions.12 "The Legislature
cannot limit or abridge the general jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as conferred by the constitution." 13
The duty of a court of equity has been to prevent irreparable
injury. This has been done by the maintenance of the status quo
184 N. Y. 458, 77 N. E. 657 (1906).
'Ibid. at 483, 77 N. E. at 658.
'Van Veghten v. Howland, 12 Abb. (N. s.) 46 (N. Y. 1872).
oN. Y. State Const., art. 6, §1 (adopted Nov. 6, 1894).
"People v. Luce, 204 N. Y. 478, 97 N. E. 850 (1912), quoting the words
of Daniel, J., in Hart v. Hatch, 3 Hun 375 (1st Dept. 1875).
"In re Stillwell, 139 N. Y. 337, 34 N. E. 777 (1895).
Ibid. at 741, 34 N. E. at 778.
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pending the termination of the litigation and such was effected by
Section 882 of the Civil Practice Act prior to its amendment. If
justice is to continue unimpeded, ex parte injunctions must be re-
stored to the statute books by the repeal of the aforementioned
amendment.
CHARLES VEIT.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAw-1931 AMENDMENTS-SOURCE OF
INTESTATE SHARE ALLOWED AFTER-AcQuIRED SPOUSE OR ISSUE
UNDER SECTION 35.-The doctrine of revocation of a Will by the
subsequent marriage and birth of children of the testator had its in-
ception in the Roman Law.1 Cicero tells us that there at all times
exists a presumption that it was not the testator's intention in
making his will to exclude from consideration the natural benefi-
ciaries of his worldly goods. Therefore, when he died leaving a
child born after the will unprovided for, the will should be revoked
and the child awarded his legal share in the estate. To exclude
children, under the rule as laid down by this decision, it was neces-
sary expressly to disinherit them in the will. 2
This theory, in substance, was followed by the majority of the
countries adopting the civil law.3 In England, the ecclesiastical
Courts limited it to cases in which there had occurred a marriage
coupled with the birth of children subsequent to the making of a
will disposing of the whole estate, applying the doctrine first to per-
sonal property only,4 and, after considerable controversy, to realty.5
The first New York case upon the subject, that of Brush v.
Wilkins,0 decided in 1820, on the authority of the previous English
decisions, ruled that mere marriage alone or the birth of children
subsequent to the making of a will constituted no revocation; that
in order in any event to effect such a result, there must be a subse-
quent marriage plus a child born of that union, such happenings
raising only a presumption of revocation, which was not conclusive.
The Revised Statutes of 1830 created a distinction between
children born after the will, and the subsequent marriage and birth
of issue of the testator, with regard to revocation. One provision,7
later Section 26 of our Decedent Estate Law, declared that when
a man executed a will and, thereafter, a child was born which sur-
I I DAvms, NEW YoRx LAW OF WILLS (1923) p. 657, §294.
'Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 511 (N. Y. 1820), Kent. Chancellor, citing
Cicero de Orat. 1.57.
' Sherry v. Lozier, 1 Bradf. 450 (N. Y. 1851); Matter of Rossignot, 50
Misc. 231, 120 N. Y. Supp. 623 (1906).
'Lugg v. Lugg, 1 Ld. Raym. 441, Salk. 592 (Eng. 1699).
Christopher v. Christopher, Dick. Rep. 445 (Eng. 1771).
Supra note 2.7 R. S. pt. 2, c. 6, tit. 1, art. 3, §49 (1830).
